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Note
A Blueprint for States To Solve the Mandatory
Arbitration Problem While Avoiding FAA
Preemption
Sam Cleveland
INTRODUCTION
When she started working at Chipotle in 2010, Araceli
Gutierrez had a dream to become a chef.1 She believed that her
new job would bring her closer to realizing this dream.2 But not
long after she started, she was working fifteen-hour days and
only getting paid for eight.3 Although this seemed strange to her,
Gutierrez soldiered on.4 She wanted to advance within the company and believed that speaking up would jeopardize this goal.5
When she eventually became an assistant manager of the store,
she tried to speak up about the issue, but those above her told
her that working extra, unpaid hours was “part of the job” and
that she could not sue.6
Low-wage workers who were forced to work unpaid hours
were, at this point, not without recourse. In 2013, a former employee sued Chipotle for lost wages.7 The complaint alleged vio-

 J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to
Adam Hansen for helping me develop this topic. I would also like to thank David
Hahn, Josh Greenberg, Hillary Hoffman, and Stanton McManus for their editorial contributions. Finally, thanks to Alan Z. Rozenshtein for helpful comments
on a draft of this Note. Copyright © 2020 by Sam Cleveland.
1. See Heather Long, Why I’m Suing Chipotle for “Wage Theft,” CNN BUS.
(Sept. 1, 2016), https://money.cnn.com/2016/09/01/news/economy/chipotle
-lawsuit-wage-theft/index.html [https://perma.cc/UN48-XSC6].
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Turner v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1303 (D.
Colo. 2014).
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lations of the Fair Labor Standards Act wage and hour provisions and requested compensation for wages withheld by
Chipotle.8 While the lawsuit was pending, the Supreme Court
decided Epic Systems v. Lewis, a case testing the enforceability
of employment contracts that require claims to be brought in
one-on-one arbitration with the company, rather than collectively in a class action or class arbitration.9 The Supreme Court
ruled that those provisions were enforceable.10 Mere weeks after
this decision, nearly three thousand members of the class action
were dismissed from the suit.11 Sometime around 2014, Chipotle
began inserting a clause in its employment contracts mandating
all disputes that may arise between the employer and employee
be resolved in one-on-one arbitration.12 Just like that, a significant number of potential class members who had suffered lost
wages were left effectively without legal recourse.
The Chipotle case illustrates the mammoth effect that mandatory arbitration agreements have in the employment context.
Wage theft and other employment-related harms are big problems that make life materially worse for the most vulnerable.13
Amongst the most effective ways of dealing with this widespread
problem is collective action, through either a class-action lawsuit
or class arbitration.14 Knowing this, and sensing the increasingly
arbitration-friendly disposition of the courts,15 employers began

8. Complaint at 56–69, Turner, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1300 (No. 1:14-cv-02612JLK).
9. 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018).
10. Id.
11. See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Opt-in Plaintiffs
Bound by Chipotle’s Arbitration Agreement, Turner, 123 F. Supp. 3d 1300 (No.
1:14-cv-02612-JLK); see also Dave Jamieson, The Supreme Court’s Arbitration
Ruling Is Already Screwing Thousands of Chipotle Workers, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 27, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/supreme-courts-ruling
-this-week-is-already-screwing-thousands-of-chipotle-workers_us_5b0844aae
4b0568a880b3e26?x6c [https://perma.cc/5XJV-YSQX].
12. Sparky Abraham, This Burrito Includes an Arbitration Clause, CURRENT AFF. (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.currentaffairs.org/2018/08/this-burrito
-includes-an-arbitration-clause/ [https://perma.cc/7KN9-GCAU].
13. See infra Part I.D.
14. See Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to
Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 85–88 (2004) (noting that individual
claims may not be financially feasible, among other problems with them).
15. See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1637 (2005).

2020]

MANDATORY ARBITRATION

2517

inserting mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts.16 While being shunted into secret one-on-one arbitrations
to resolve a dispute with an employer would offend many peoples’ sense of justice,17 employers are now entitled to do just this.
There are not many options to effectively remedy the problem posed by this situation. The already arbitration-friendly Supreme Court has become even more pro-arbitration and hostile
to employee claims.18 Indeed, the Supreme Court has “exhibited
singular determination in upholding t[his] federal policy on arbitration.”19 While federal legislation would be a preferable solution,20 Congress has not shown an appetite for taking on arbitration in recent years.21 The ability of agencies to help remedy this
problem is doubtful, as shown in Epic Systems, where an
agency’s interpretation of a statute was found to be secondary to
the force of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).22

16. Id. at 1638 (“Once the Supreme Court began to issue decisions stating
that commercial arbitration was ‘favored’ and that arbitration of employment
claims could be permitted, businesses jumped on the opportunity to compel arbitration in contexts where they previously thought arbitration agreements
would not be enforced.”).
17. See infra Part I.C.
18. See Russ Bleemer et al., Kavanaugh on Arbitration, CPR SPEAKS (July
16, 2018), https://blog.cpradr.org/2018/07/16/kavanaugh-on-arbitration/
[https://perma.cc/JF8J-86RM] (explaining that Kavanaugh’s decisions show a
pro-business, pro-arbitration leaning); Erin Mulvaney, Brett Kavanaugh “Looks
for Ways To Rule for Employers,” NAT’L L.J. (July 12, 2018), https://www.law
.com/nationallawjournal/2018/07/12/brett-kavanaugh-looks-for-ways-to-rule
-for-employers/?kw=&slreturn=20200205141045 [https://perma.cc/J3QZ
-Y6QY].
19. THOMAS CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION xix
(2d ed. 2007).
20. See Richard A. Bales & Sue Irion, How Congress Can Make a More Equitable Federal Arbitration Act, 113 PA. ST. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (2009) (explaining why Congress changing the laws regarding arbitration is a more realistic
outcome).
21. A house bill, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017), prohibiting pre-dispute arbitration agreements in an employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights dispute did not make it out of committee. Senator Richard Blumenthal introduced
similar legislation in the Senate, S. Res. 2591, 115th Cong. (2018), which also
failed to make it out of committee. Similar legislation had been introduced before and was met with equal apathy. E.g., S. Res. 1133, 114th Cong. (2015); S.
Res. 878, 113th Cong. (2013).
22. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622–23 (2018) (citing 9
U.S.C. § 2 (2018)).
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Considering the degree to which federal remedies seem unlikely, the answer to stemming mandatory arbitration in the employment context likely rests with the states.23 Individual states
have attempted to counteract the preference towards arbitration, but these approaches have heretofore been unsuccessful.24
This Note proposes a novel approach: for states to limit the illeffects of mandatory arbitration by crafting laws governing contract formation.25 These laws would be grounded in bedrock contract formation principles and would, if properly drafted, avoid
the looming preemption issues with state laws concerning arbitration.26 If written in a way that does not single out arbitration,
such laws a could significantly curtail, if not eliminate, the negative effects of mandatory arbitration in employment contracts.27 This Note provides a roadmap to state legislatures and
state courts to effect this approach.
Part I examines the history of the Federal Arbitration Act,
specifically as it relates to mandatory arbitration in employment
contracts. It also explains the reasons why these clauses are
problematic and focuses on the effects they have on low-wage
workers. Part II discusses efforts, heretofore unsuccessful, to
stem the tide of mandatory arbitration. The Supreme Court has
closed off many of the possible avenues of combating the injustice posed by mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts, but all hope is not yet lost. Part III proposes a solution
that threads the needle through the thicket of the Supreme
Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence. In order to combat mandatory arbitration clauses, state legislatures can look to basic
contract principles in order to require a “back to the basics” approach to contract formation. Any state attempting this approach will need to be acutely aware of the potential pitfalls and
traps inherent in this strategy, but should it be successful, states
can significantly curtail negative effects associated with mandatory pre-dispute arbitration.28 Not only that, but such laws

23. See infra Part II.C.
24. See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421
(2017) (upholding an arbitration clause despite the Kentucky Supreme Court’s
holding that the arbitration clause was unenforceable).
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part III.B.
27. See infra Part III.B.
28. See infra Part II.B.
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would also have a secondary effect of stemming other inequitable
terms in adhesive contracts.29
I. THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
AND MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES
The FAA as originally enacted had a much narrower scope
than the way it has been interpreted since.30 The current interpretation has strayed far from Congress’s original intention.31
Far from being inconsequential, this drift has proved to be harmful to some of the most vulnerable segments of the population,32
an effect which is exacerbated by other changes that have made
for a hostile environment for workers.33 In order to illuminate
the solution proposed by this Note, this Part gives background
information on the history of the FAA, the Supreme Court’s FAA
jurisprudence broadening the scope of the statute, the rise of the
use of mandatory arbitration in contracts of adhesion, and the
state of workers’ rights.
A. THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
The use of arbitration has a long history.34 Arbitration was
used in what is now the United States as early as 1650,35 but its
use was almost always limited to disputes between businesses.36
In the early days, powerful parties did not use arbitration as a
way to deny parties with less bargaining power (such as employees, consumers, or franchisees) the ability to vindicate their
claims.37
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there was a
perceived “judicial hostility” to arbitration,38 although there is
29. See infra Part III.B.
30. See infra Part I.A.
31. See infra Part I.B.
32. See infra Part I.C.
33. See infra Part I.D.
34. See JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS
TO LOCARNO 153–89 (discussing, among other topics, arbitration between Greek
gods, the arbitration system in ancient Greece, Roman participation in the
Greek form of arbitration, and arbitration in the Middle Ages).
35. Id. at 190.
36. See Sternlight, supra note 15, at 1636.
37. Id.
38. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001) (“As the
Court has explained, the FAA was a response to hostility of American courts to
the enforcement of arbitration agreements, a judicial disposition inherited from
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doubt about whether American courts were truly hostile to arbitration or whether they simply felt “bound by a precedent they
no longer agreed with but which they felt required legislative
action to undo.”39 To abrogate the use of these doctrines, foster
certainty,40 and abolish these “anachronism[s] of our American
law,”41 which were employed despite “frequent protest” by
courts,42 Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in
1925.43
Most of the support for passage of the FAA came from business groups and commercial organizations which had already
been effectively using arbitration.44 Business came to favor arbitration for its efficiency, ease, preservation of business relationships, and quickness.45 Much of the FAA’s legislative history
shows that Congress only contemplated arbitration between

then-longstanding English practice.”). This hostility was inherited from the
English system of law, which relied on principles of “ouster” and “revocability,”
which disfavored arbitration. See David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act
Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1224
(2013).
39. Stephen E. Friedman, Trusting Courts with Arbitration Provisions, 68
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 821, 846 (2018). Indeed, courts were expressing skepticism
about the doctrines of revocability and ouster as early as fifty years prior to the
enactment of the FAA. Id. at 847.
40. See David S. Clancy & Matthew M.K. Stein, An Uninvited Guest: Class
Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act’s Legislative History, 63 BUS. LAW.
55, 61 (2007) (“This bill simply provides for one thing, and that is to give an
opportunity to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and admiralty
contracts—an agreement to arbitrate, when voluntarily placed in the document
by the parties to it. It does not involve any new principle of law except to provide
a simple method by which the parties may be brought before the court in order
to give enforcement to that which they have already agreed to.” (citing 65 CONG.
REC. 1931 (1924) (statement of the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee))).
41. See Horton, supra note 38, at 1225 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1
(1924)).
42. Id.
43. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, § 1, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (codified at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1947)).
44. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and
H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16
(1924) (statement of Julius Cohen) (“[T]he statement I make is backed up by 73
commercial organizations in the country who have, by a formal vote, approved
of the bill before you gentlemen.”).
45. See id.
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businesses.46 Additionally the FAA was not meant to reach employment contracts.47 W.H.H. Piatt, an advocate for the FAA,
stated that the Act would not cover workers,48 and the constitutional understanding at that time was that employment contracts were strictly intrastate, and thus outside of Congress’s
plenary powers.49 To ensure that employees were not covered by
the FAA, Congress expressly excluded “seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce,”50 those being the only employees that Congress
thought it had power to regulate at that time.51 Drafters of the
FAA similarly did not intend for it to cover contracts of adhesion.52 Piatt stated that “I would not favor any kind of legislation
that would permit the forcing a man to sign . . . [an adhesive]
contract [containing a mandatory arbitration clause]”53 since the
primary use of arbitration agreements was to settle disputes between merchants.54
46. In arguing for why the FAA was needed, one of the bill’s biggest proponents, Julius Cohen, stated that an agreement to arbitrate was essentially a
business contract and should be honored just like other business contracts. The
then-chairman of the Committee of Commerce Trade and Commercial Law of
the American Bar Association, W.H.H. Piatt, stated that the FAA was “purely
an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it.” Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 104,
106 (2006) (citing Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214
Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923)).
47. Id. at 105.
48. Id.
49. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 136 (2001) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“When the Act was passed (and the commerce power was closely
confined) our case law indicated that the only employment relationships subject
to the commerce power were those in which workers were actually engaged in
interstate commerce.”).
50. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
51. See Moses, supra note 46, at 106.
52. Contracts of adhesion are offered on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis where
one party is in a substantially stronger bargaining position than the other. See
Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 833, 855–56 (1964) (discussing contracts of adhesion and compulsory contracts).
53. See Moses, supra note 46, at 107.
54. Id.; see also Sternlight, supra note 15, at 1636 n.18 (citing Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting)).
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Finally, the FAA’s language and legislative history portend
that Congress did not intend to supersede states’ public policy
regarding contracts nor for the FAA to apply in state courts. Sections three and four of the FAA state that the statute applies to
“the courts of the United States” and “United States district
court[s].”55 The legislative history also evinces an intent for the
FAA to be a procedural rule to apply only in federal courts.56
States would still retain their traditional authority to determine
if an enforceable contract exists in the first place.57 Indeed, in his
testimony, Cohen, who helped draft the FAA, emphasized that
“[t]here is no disposition therefore by means of the Federal
bludgeon to force an individual State into an unwilling submission to arbitration enforcement.”58 The FAA was enacted during
the “golden age of the public policy doctrine” when courts found
contracts unenforceable due to violations of public policy more
than often than they invoked other defenses such as mistake,
duress, lack of consideration, or the statute of frauds.59 As such,
a legislator in 1925 would likely have thought that the public
policy defense would fit within the § 2 savings clause.60
B. THE PERVERSION OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
While those who passed the FAA viewed it as having a limited scope,61 the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the law since,
and especially in the past few decades, has morphed the FAA
into a law that no legislator in 1925 would recognize. Justice
O’Connor called the Court’s FAA jurisprudence “an edifice of its
own creation” which the Court built by “abandon[ing] all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent.”62

55. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4; see also Horton, supra note 38, at 1226–27 (“[H]alf of
the FAA’s . . . sections expressly apply only to federal courts.”).
56. See Horton, supra note 38, at 1227 (“[T]he House Report on the FAA
declares that ‘[w]hether an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is
a question of procedure to be determined by the law [of the] court in which the
proceeding is brought and not one of substantive law.’”); see also Moses, supra
note 46, at 110 (explaining that the Committee members envisioned the FAA as
a procedural statute related only to federal court).
57. Horton, supra note 38, at 1260.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1223–24.
60. Id.
61. See supra Part I.A.
62. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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1. Initial Expansion of the Scope of the FAA
In the decades following the enactment of the FAA, the use
of arbitration remained largely the same and courts’ interpretations hewed rather closely to the FAA’s purpose. In the 1970s
and 1980s, however, the Supreme Court’s view of the FAA
changed dramatically.63 In 1983 the Court first announced that
federal policy favors the arbitration of claims.64 Saying that the
FAA was a “congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements,”65 the Court declared that “any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”66 The Court would use this language and the broad federal policy which it purports to have
brought to light numerous times in the ensuing years to expand
the scope of the FAA.67
A year later in Southland Corp. v. Keating the Supreme
Court held, for the first time, that the FAA applies in state courts
and that it supersedes contrary state law.68 The Court explained
that Congress made a substantive rule by enacting the FAA and
that it applies regardless of the forum in which the claim is
brought.69 Congress, according to the Court, “intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of
arbitration agreements.”70
The next major expansion of the scope of the FAA came in
1991 in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.71 Although the
63. Sternlight, supra note 15, at 1637.
64. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983); see also Sternlight, supra note 15, at 1637.
65. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24; see Sternlight supra note
15, at 1637.
66. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25.
67. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018) (quoting
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” in support of enforcing
the parties’ arbitration agreement); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.
333, 339 (2011) (same); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132
n.14 (2001) (same).
68. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1984) (“[S]ince the overwhelming proportion of all civil litigation in this country is in the state courts,
we cannot believe Congress intended to limit the Arbitration Act to disputes
subject only to federal-court jurisdiction.”); see also Horton, supra note 38, at
1227 (discussing the Supreme Court decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1 (1984)).
69. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 11, 15.
70. Id. at 16.
71. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 created a cause
of action for those who were victims of age discrimination, the
Court in Gilmer held that an agreement to arbitrate trumped the
statutory right of action.72 The extension of the FAA to cover a
statutory claim in an employment context was seen as a significant expansion of the scope of the FAA.73
2. State Preemption
A significant portion of the judicial expansion of the FAA
has occurred by narrowing the scope of the statute’s savings
clause.74 The wheels of FAA preemption were set in motion in
Southland,75 but the frequency with which the Supreme Court
finds state laws to be preempted by the FAA has increased since.
Perry v. Thomas represents the beginning of the Court’s expansion of the scope of FAA preemption of state laws.76 In Perry,
a securities salesman brought suit against his former employer
under a California statute that provided for actions to collect
wages “without regard to the existence of any private agreement
to arbitrate.”77 The Court held that under the Supremacy Clause
the FAA preempts the state statute.78 Perhaps the most important aspect of Perry lies in footnote nine, which clarifies the
scope of FAA preemption:
An agreement to arbitrate is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, as a
matter of federal law, “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.” Thus state law, whether of
legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern
issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely
from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport
with this requirement of § 2.79

Thus, state laws that single out arbitration are preempted, while
those that govern “contracts generally” are not.
72. Id. at 35.
73. See George Nicolau, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: Its Ramifications and Implications for Employees, Employers and Practitioners, 1 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 182 (1998) (explaining that the extension of the FAA to
the employment context, rather than just commercial contracts, was “a significant extension of previous rulings”).
74. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
75. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 11–12.
76. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
77. CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 2015).
78. Perry, 482 U.S. at 491.
79. Id. at 492 n.9 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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The Court bolstered this preemption doctrine in AlliedBruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson.80 Prior to Allied-Bruce, courts
were unsure how to apply § 2 of the FAA which states that an
agreement to arbitrate is enforceable in “a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce.”81 In Allied-Bruce, the Supreme
Court adopted the broadest possible interpretation—that the
FAA covers all contracts affecting commerce.82 In addition to
“eviscerat[ing] state statutes meant to protect consumers,” the
Court’s holding “expanded the FAA to cover transactions for
which it was never designed.”83
In Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, a franchisee brought
suit against a franchisor with whom he had signed an agreement
to arbitrate.84 The Montana Supreme Court concluded that the
agreement was covered by the FAA, but held that the agreement
was rendered unenforceable by a violation of a Montana state
law requiring agreements to arbitrate to be on the first page of
the agreement in underlined capital letters.85 In deciding
whether the state law was preempted, the Montana Supreme
Court considered the question of whether the state law would
“undermine the goals and policies of the FAA.”86 The Supreme
Court clarified that this consideration was unnecessary.87 Instead, the Court plainly stated that “Courts may not . . . invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to
arbitration provisions.”88 Threshold limitations, such as the notice provision, the Court said, are “antithetical” to the goals and
policies of the FAA.89
Undeterred by the legislative history suggesting that the
contracts of employees were intended to not be covered by the
FAA,90 the Court held in Circuit City Stores v. Adams that the
80. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
81. See id. at 269–70 (discussing different court interpretations of § 2 of the
FAA).
82. Id. at 270.
83. Janet M. Grossnickle, Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson: How the
Federal Arbitration Act Will Keep Consumers and Corporations Out of the
Courtroom, 36 B.C. L. REV. 769, 769 (1995) (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.
v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282–83 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
84. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
85. Id. at 684.
86. Id. at 685.
87. Id. at 688.
88. Id. at 687.
89. Id. at 688.
90. See supra Part I.A.
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contracts of transportation workers are the only employment
contracts outside the scope of the FAA.91 Circuit City clarified
what had before been the subject of debate:92 businesses may require their employees to resolve disputes through arbitration.93
Circuit City was heralded as a “big[] pro-business decision” that
signaled “a very good year for big corporations.”94
In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion the Court not only bolstered
the state preemption doctrine, but also laid the groundwork to
preclude class-wide arbitrations.95 In Concepcion, consumers received “free” phones from AT&T but were later charged sales
tax.96 The agreement that consumers entered into mandated arbitration and prohibited class arbitrations.97 However, when the
plaintiff brought this claim in federal district court and AT&T
moved to compel arbitration, the court refused to compel arbitration, relying on California’s rule98 that unconscionable agreements to arbitrate would not be enforced.99 When the case
reached the Supreme Court, the Court held that this rule was
preempted by § 2 of the FAA.100 In Concepcion, the Court extended the preemption doctrine to cover “state-law rules that
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”101 Even though the Discover Bank rule rested on unconscionability, a doctrine that would seem to be a “ground[] [that]
91. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001).
92. The Court in Circuit City noted the circuit split on this question. Id. at
110–11; see also Mark Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration Work?, 61
UMKC L. REV. 693, 707–09 (1993) (noting the uncertainty regarding which employment contracts are covered by the FAA); David E. Feller, Putting Gilmer
Where It Belongs: The FAA’s Labor Exemption, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
253 (2000) (discussing different interpretations of the labor exception).
93. Kristin McCandless, Comment, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams: The
Debate over Arbitration Agreements in the Employment Context Rages On, 80
DENV. U. L. REV. 225, 235 (2002).
94. Id. (citing Robert S. Greenberger, Businesses See Gains in High-Court
Term, WALL STREET J., June 29, 2001, at B4).
95. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
96. The Concepcions paid only $30.22 in sales tax for the phone, making
this case the perfect example of how many claims only make sense to bring as a
class. Id. at 337.
97. See id. at 336.
98. This is often called the Discover Bank rule, alluding to the case in which
this rule was announced. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100
(2005).
99. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 338; see also Discover Bank, 113 P.3d 1100 .
100. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352.
101. Id. at 343.
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exist[s] at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,”102
the Supreme Court nevertheless held it to be preempted.103
Another key holding of Concepcion is that class arbitration
is inconsistent with the FAA,104 a holding which the Supreme
Court’s expanded in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis.105 The cases
consolidated in Epic Systems all involved employment contracts
with agreements to arbitrate on an individual basis.106 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had, in 2012, held that requiring an employee to sign an agreement to arbitrate claims
individually as a condition of employment violated the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).107 This holding “effectively nullified” the FAA in cases where employees wished to assert claims
as a class against an employer.108 In Epic Systems, employees
argued that this interpretation of the NLRA is a “ground” that
“exists at law . . . for the revocation of their arbitration agreements,” and thus fits within the savings clause.109
The Court rejected this argument, relying again on its narrow interpretation of the “any contract” language of the savings
clause.110 Rather than being based on a ground that would apply
to all contracts, the court reasoned, employees objected to the
agreements to arbitrate specifically because they require individual arbitration in violation of the NLRB’s interpretation of
the NLRA.111 Doing so interferes with one of the fundamental
attributes of arbitration, according to the Court.112 Relying on
Concepcion, the Court stated that “courts may not allow a contract defense to reshape traditional individualized arbitration by
mandating class wide arbitration procedures without the parties’ consent.”113 The Court refused to distinguish the case from
Concepcion, saying that Concepcion’s “rationale and rule” apply

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018); supra note 98 and accompanying text.
See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352.
Id. at 344.
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
Id. at 1619–20.
D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2292 (2012).
Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1620.
Id. at 1622.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1623.
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to a case where a contract term is rendered illegal the same way
it applied in Concepcion.114
In conclusion, the scope of the FAA today would be virtually
unrecognizable to the Congress that originally enacted it. The
FAA has been interpreted to encompass contracts between employers and employees, contrary to what Congress intended in
1925. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
FAA has led to a trampling of state contract and arbitration law,
which Congress did not intend when it enacted the FAA. In a
series of 5–4 decisions115 the Court has transformed what was
originally understood to be a narrow procedural rule for federal
courts into an all-encompassing beast trampling state contract
law and tenets of basic fairness.
C. RISE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND THE HARMS
THAT EMANATE
Mandatory arbitration clauses pervade many facets of our
everyday life. A 2004 study found that more than a third of consumer transactions made an average person living in Los Angeles subject to mandatory arbitration.116 One would expect that
this number has gone up, in part due to decisions like Concepcion, which incentivize corporations to use mandatory arbitration clauses in their contracts. Use of mandatory arbitration
clauses by employers has increased from only two percent in
1992 to fifty-four percent today.117 This percentage corresponds
to 60.1 million American workers who are now barred from
bringing a suit against their employer in court.118 Of those 60.1
million, nearly 25 million are contractually forbidden from bringing or participating in a class action lawsuit.119

114. Id.
115. Among other FAA cases, Epic Systems, Concepcion, and Circuit City
were all 5–4 decisions.
116. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” To Arbitrate
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience,
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62 (2004).
117. The Editorial Board, The Supreme Court Sticks It to Workers, Again,
N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/opinion/
supreme-court-workers-payment.html [https://perma.cc/C4ED-WDVG].
118. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE GROWING USE OF
MANDATORY ARBITRATION 5 (2018).
119. Id. at 11.

2020]

MANDATORY ARBITRATION

2529

Mandating arbitration negatively impacts an employee’s
ability and willingness to bring a claim.120 One of the most significant critiques of mandatory arbitration, however, is not related to individuals, but rather the public harm that occurs as a
result of mandatory arbitration.121 The “public justice” critique
posits that the curtailing of public trials and the retardation of
the development of public precedent are some of the biggest
harms that come from mandatory arbitration.122 This critique
suggests that the private market (arbitration) cannot be counted
on to provide the same public good that courts can.123 Aside from
the fairness and consistency usually demonstrated by courts,
they also serve an “educative function” of informing the public
how laws are being interpreted.124 Private means of dispute resolution, like arbitration, typically do not serve these same functions.125
Another critique of arbitration is that its use runs counter
to democratic values.126 When arbitration is mandatory and
binding, arbitration may “erode public trust in the courts and in
the law.”127 By taking place in non-public forums and by allowing
parties to exclude arbitrators, arbitration fails to be participatory in a democratic sense.128 Arbitration also offers little in the
way of accountability,129 another key democratic tenet. Arbitration is also less transparent than proceedings in an open court.130
Rather than the philosophical considerations of the inadequacy of arbitration system, what matters most for workers is
the actual ability to bring a claim in an impartial forum and to
obtain relief. Unfortunately for workers, arbitration often does
120. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990’s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV.
1017, 1019 (1996).
121. See Sternlight, supra note 15, at 1661.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1662 (citing David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622 (1995)).
124. See Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at Gilmer’s Quinceañera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331, 369 (2006).
125. Sternlight, supra note 15, at 1672.
126. See Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279 (2004) (examining the “relationship between arbitration and constitutional democracy”).
127. Id. at 295.
128. Id. at 299.
129. Id. at 300–01.
130. Id. at 301.
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not provide such a forum. The drafter of a contract containing a
mandatory arbitration clause, which is almost always the employer,131 is in a position to game the terms of the arbitration in
their favor.132 The drafter, or the “pinstriped exploiter[],” as one
court has referred to them,133 selects the arbitrator or the arbitration provider, which can lead to bias on the part of the arbitrator.134 An arbitrator’s desire to appease the employer-contract
drafter in hopes of future business may influence the arbitrator’s
decision-making process in favor of that employer.135 The employer is significantly more likely than the employee to have
been through multiple arbitrations before, leading to a “repeat
player” problem where the employer knows the rules and proclivities of the arbitrator far better than the employee.136 Finally,
the drafter of the arbitration provision may tailor the provision
to impose additional costs on the employee.137 This costliness
problem is compounded when an employer prohibits employees
from proceeding with their claims jointly.138
Empirics support the assertion that requiring mandatory
arbitration works against workers’ rights. Lower-income employees are often made to pay forum fees or attorney fees, or
both.139 These high costs may price employees out of the arbitration market.140 Generally, damage awards are lower in arbitration than they are in a judicial forum.141 The data on this is subject to some qualification, but median awards are higher in

131. Accord Nicholas S. Wilson, Freedom of Contract and Adhesion Contracts, 14 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 172, 173 (1965).
132. See Sternlight, supra note 15, at 1650.
133. Lytle v. Citifinancial Services, Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 661 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2002).
134. Sternlight, supra note 15, at 1650.
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974)).
137. Id. at 1651. This may be done by holding the arbitration in a distant
place, increasing transaction costs, selecting an arbitrator with high fees, or
limiting discovery to expensive means. Id.
138. Id. at 1651–52.
139. See Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low
Cost, DISP. RESOL. J., May–July 2003, at 12 (discussing how arbitration clauses
can be used to impose costs on customers and employees).
140. See Bales, supra note 124, at 346 (“[H]igh arbitration costs can risk
pricing employees out of the market.”).
141. See id. at 350 (comparing arbitration and litigation costs).
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judicial forums than arbitral forums,142 and damages awarded
as a percentage of damages demanded are significantly higher
in judicial awards than arbitral awards.143 Additionally, arbitration has been shown to have disparate impacts on different
groups. Notably, women are less likely than men to obtain a
“win” at arbitration.144 Due to the relatively racially homogenous
makeup of arbitration panels, some have speculated that people
of color may be disadvantaged in an arbitral forum.145 This problem is compounded by the fact that arbitrators are selected by
the parties rather than randomly assigned, as with judges.146
In sum, mandatory arbitration is damaging to both individual worker’s rights and the public good writ large. Employers
mandating individual arbitrations would be less problematic if
employers and employees entered into employment contracts at
arm’s length. Unfortunately, this is almost never the case.147 As
such, requiring individuals to bring their claims on an individual
basis is at odds with basic tenets of fairness.148
D. THE STATE OF WORKERS’ RIGHTS
The state of worker rights and worker power in America has
reached what some consider to be a “crisis level[].”149 Such a crisis is due to a multitude of factors. The power of unions has been

142. Id. (citing Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An Empirical Comparison 16–19 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 65, 2003),
https://ssrn.com/abstract-id=389780).
143. See id. at 350 (citing Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 48–49 (1998)
(“[Maltby] found that the mean litigated award was 70% of the demand, while
the mean arbitrated award was 25% of the demand.”)).
144. See id. at 351–52 (discussing effects of mandatory arbitration on different classes of employees).
145. See generally Michael Z. Green, An Essay Challenging the Racially Biased Selection of Arbitrators for Employment Discrimination Claims, 4 J. AM.
ARB. 1 (2005) (claiming that the race of the arbitrator has a significant impact
on employment discrimination disputes).
146. See Bales, supra note 124, at 352 (explaining how arbitrators are selected).
147. See infra Part II.A.
148. See generally Sternlight, supra note 15 (discussing why mandatory arbitration is problematic).
149. MICHELLE MILLER & ERIC HARRIS BERNSTEIN, ROOSEVELT INST., NEW
FRONTIERS OF WORKER POWER: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE MODERN ECONOMY 2 (2017).
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diminishing for decades150 due to legislative151 and judicial152 assaults on unions. Additionally, many unionized jobs have been
shipped abroad, further weakening union power and making
good-paying jobs that do not require a college degree scarcer.153
Wages for some workers have been stagnant for the past few decades,154 and the rise155 of the “gig economy” means less predictability and fewer benefits for workers.156
150. See Union Members: 2019, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QSX
-XGUS] (showing that only 10.3% of U.S. workers are union members, down
from 20.1% in 1983, the first year the Bureau of Labor Statistics kept statistics
on union membership).
151. See DAVID MADLAND & ALEX ROWELL, ATTACKS ON PUBLIC-SECTOR
UNIONS HARM STATES 2 (2017), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/
uploads/sites/2/2017/11/15074954/ImpactofWisconsinAct10-brief.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JT4D-YFEJ] (showing the ill-effects of Wisconsin’s Act 10); FRANK
MANZO IV & ROBERT BRUNO, THE IMPACT OF “RIGHT-TO-WORK” LAWS ON LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES IN THREE MIDWEST STATES: EVIDENCE FROM INDIANA,
MICHIGAN, AND WISCONSIN (2010–2016) (2017), https://ler.illinois.edu/wp
-content/uploads/2017/03/RTW-in-the-Midwest-2010-2016.pdf [https://perma
.cc/W8ZN-T9HJ] (showing that workers in states that had adopted “right-towork” laws earned less and were less likely to be a member of a union).
152. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S.
Ct. 2448, 2449 (2018) (holding that a state cannot require non-union members
to contribute agency fees to the union); Dana Goldstein & Erica L. Green, What
the Supreme Court’s Janus Decision Means for Teacher Unions, N.Y. TIMES
(June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/teacher-unions-fallout
-supreme-court-janus.html [https://perma.cc/49H7-PT37] (speculating that the
Janus decision may harm teachers’ unions specifically).
153. See generally Charles R. Perry, Outsourcing and Union Power, 18 J.
LAB. RES. 521 (1997) (explaining how outsourcing has diminished the power of
unions).
154. See Drew DeSilver, For Most U.S. Workers, Real Wages Have Barely
Budged in Decades, PEW RESEARCH: FACTTANK (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/07/for-most-us-workers-real-wages-have
-barely-budged-for-decades/ [https://perma.cc/YQ9K-HPLM] (“[T]oday’s real average wage [-] has about the same purchasing power it did 40 years ago.”); Lawrence Mishel et al., Wage Stagnation in Nine Charts, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Jan. 6,
2015), https://www.epi.org/publication/charting-wage-stagnation/ [https://
perma.cc/4SKS-YCXF] (discussing wage trends of the last three decades).
155. The “gig economy” is estimated to include 34% of U.S. workers and was
projected to increase to 43% by 2020. Patrick Gillespie, Intuit: Gig Economy Is
34% of US Workforce, CNN BUS. (May 24, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/
05/24/news/economy/gig-economy-intuit/index.html [https://perma.cc/2U9R
-KSVQ].
156. See Adrian Chen, Next Stop, Uberland: The Onrushing Algorithmic Future of Work, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 15, 2018), http://nymag.com/
intelligencer/2018/11/alex-rosenblats-uberland-review.html?utm_campaign=
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Against this worker-unfriendly backdrop the problem of
wage theft runs rampant. Wage theft is when an employer fails
to pay an employee money that the employee is legally entitled
to.157 Wage theft includes instances where an employee is not
paid the mandated minimum wage, not paid overtime, misclassified as an independent contractor, or made to work unpaid
time before or after a shift, among other violations.158 Wage theft
is a “transfer from low-income employees to business owners
that worsens income inequality, hurts workers and their families, and damages the sense of fairness and justice that a democracy needs to survive.”159 The problem of wage theft disproportionately affects women and foreign-born workers,160 and those
who report it may face retaliation in the workplace.161
When workers wish to vindicate their rights and obtain
their rightfully-earned pay that is due to them, the most effective
course of action is often collective action.162 Typically, no individual is owed enough money to make it worth it for an attorney to
take the case on an individual basis.163 To cure this problem,
nym&utm_medium=s1&utm_source=tw [https://perma.cc/JG8T-5DP6] (detailing the invasiveness inherent in driving for Uber as well as the poverty-wage
level pay); see also Robert Reich, The Downside of the Gig Economy, NEWSWEEK
(Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.newsweek.com/downside-gig-economy-365422/
[https://perma.cc/JHR9-HSVT] (explaining how the “gig economy” negatively affects workers’ benefits).
157. See BRADY MEIXELL & ROSS EISENBREY, ECON. POL’Y INST., AN EPIDEMIC OF WAGE THEFT IS COSTING WORKERS HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS A YEAR 1 (2014) (explaining the definition of “wage theft”); What Is Wage
Theft?, UCLA LABOR CTR. (May 6, 2015), https://www.labor.ucla.edu/wage
-theft/ [https://perma.cc/4V9S-7LTK] (same).
158. See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 2–4
(2009) (explaining different kinds of violations of employment and labor laws).
159. MEIXELL & EISENBREY, supra note 157, at 1–2.
160. See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 158, at 5 (“Women were significantly
more likely than men to experience minimum wage violations, and foreign-born
workers were nearly twice as likely as their U.S.-born counterparts to have a
minimum wage violation.”).
161. See id. at 24–25 (finding that 43% of those who reported wage theft
faced retaliatory action at work).
162. See SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, 14TH ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION REPORT 3 (2018), https://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/publications/
2018_Workplace_Class_Action_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8S8-8K27]
(showing that class action settlements against employers exceeded $2.72 billion
in 2017).
163. See Noah Feldman, This Is What a More Conservative Supreme Court
Looks Like, BLOOMBERG (May 22, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/
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bringing the claims as a class action is often a more efficient
method of asserting employees’ claims.164 Class actions make it
easier for employees to bring claims against their employer.165
Instead of finding a lawyer, initiating a lawsuit, and going
through discovery, often for someone to join a class action, all
they need to do is opt in. Employers also fear class actions, as
these lawsuits can result in the company being liable for hundreds of millions of dollars.166
II. THE NUMEROUS OBSTACLES TO AN EFFECTIVE
SOLUTION FOR THE MANDATORY ARBITRATION
PROBLEM
The collision of Supreme Court jurisprudence distorting the
FAA and the rise of the use of mandatory arbitration clauses
spells harm for vulnerable parties—a harm exacerbated by an
already hostile environment for these parties. While this result
is clearly unjust and unpalatable, whether an effective solution
exists is less clear. The combination of judicial drift from bedrock
contractual principles, the creation of a monolithic FAA through
preemption of state contract law, and the insufficiency and unlikelihood of meaningful action at either the federal or state level
creates a thicket through which the emergence of solutions
seems unlikely. This is not to say, however, that solutions are
impossible, only that any attempt at a solution must be aware of
articles/2018-05-22/this-is-what-a-more-conservative-supreme-court-looks-like
[https://perma.cc/2VC9-ZUDG] (explaining why individuals in the cases
brought up class actions). It is important to note that this should not be taken
to mean that these claims are insignificant. To many employees, the sums they
are due would be significant. However, the amount owed is often less than what
it would cost for the attorney to spend the time necessary to obtain a judgement.
As an example, see Dee DePass, Surly Settles $2.5 Million Class-Action Lawsuit
over Mandatory Tip-Pooling, STAR TRIB. (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www
.startribune.com/surly-settles-2-5-million-class-action-lawsuit-over-alleged
-mandatory-tip-pooling/478407383/ [https://perma.cc/RU7H-SUKS] (noting
that each member of the class action would be entitled to $11,600).
164. See Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUDS. 47, 48–54 (1975) (explaining
the comparative efficiency of class actions).
165. See Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1214 (11th Cir.
2011) (describing sworn affidavits submitted by consumer law attorneys stating
that the consumers’ claims would not be cost-effective for them to take unless
the claims were brought as a class action).
166. See SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, supra note 162, at 33 (listing the top two
settlements in privately-brought plaintiff wage and hour class actions as $227
million and $110 million).
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the potential pitfalls past attempted solutions have fallen victim
to. By avoiding these pitfalls, a workable, effective solution may
come to light, as this Note proposes in Part III.
A. DRIFT FROM BASIC CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES
At the core of any first-year contracts course in law school
are various bedrock contractual principles.167 These basic
contractual principles168 serve to promote fairness,169 efficiency,170 and predictability.171 Although these principles are
generally regarded as black letter law,172 courts do not always
strictly adhere to them. Straying from these principles causes
harm to parties with weaker bargaining positions, especially in
the context of the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate.
One of the most fundamental doctrines in contract law is the
requirement of mutual assent.173 Mutual assent to a contract

167. See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, Syllabus for Contract Law 2–3 (2017) (unpublished course syllabus) (on file with author) (listing mutual assent, consideration, and promissory estoppel as concepts that will be taught).
168. These include concepts such as mutual assent through offer and acceptance, unconscionability, voiding contracts as against public policy, mistake,
and duress.
169. See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry
and the “Law of Satisfaction”—A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349,
368 (1995) (stating that many strict contract law principles have been supplanted by a growth of more equitable doctrines); Carolyn Edwards, Freedom of
Contract and Fundamental Fairness for Individual Parties: The Tug of War
Continues, 77 UMKC L. REV. 647, 648 (2009) (noting that contract law developed largely to preserve fundamental fairness for contracting parties). See generally Josse Klijnsma, Contract Law as Fairness, 28 RATIO JURIS 68 (2015) (applying John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness to the field of contract law).
170. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Justice, Fault, and Efficiency in Contract Law,
3 ITALIAN L.J. 37, 38 (2017) (explaining that the capitalist conception of contract
law is that it should be facilitative and increase efficiency); e.g., Jody S. Kraus,
Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical Integration
Strategy, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 420, 420 (2001) (“Economic contract theories seek to
explain and justify contract law by analyzing the extent to which contract doctrines promote efficiency.”).
171. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 577 (2003) (noting that businesses
prefer a textualist approach to contract interpretation due to the certainty and
predictability provided by that approach).
172. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (“[T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange . . . .”).
173. See id. § 18 (“Manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange requires
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means that the parties have had a “meeting of the minds,” meaning that both parties to a contract have reached a tacit agreement regarding the meaning of contract.174 The concept of mutual assent through a meeting of the minds is offended, however,
when a contract isn’t negotiated between two parties, but is rather offered on a take-it-or-leave-it-basis, so-called “contracts of
adhesion.”175 The term “contract of adhesion,” often used pejoratively,176 refers to those contracts in which “a single will is exclusively predominant, acting as a unilateral will which dictates its
law . . . to the adhesion of those who would wish to accept the
law.”177 Adhesive contracts are the “dominant means of regulating exchanges between organizations and individuals in contemporary life.”178 Even the Supreme Court has recognized that “the
times in which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”179
Although adhesive contracts promote efficiency by reducing
transactional costs,180 these contracts are typically neither read
nor understood by the non-drafting party. Form contracts are
generally long, complex, and not negotiated for by the non-drafting party.181 Additionally, it is considered a “modern reality” that
employers have the power to require a potential employee to
that each party either make a promise or begin or render a performance.”); LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 3 (one vol. ed. 1952) (describing elements
of forming a contract).
174. See Mutual Assent, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (William S. Anderson ed., 3d ed. 1969).
175. The term “contract of adhesion” was coined by Edwin W. Patterson, who
derived it from a study of the German Civil Code by a French jurist. Edwin W.
Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
833, 856 (1964).
176. Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
627, 627 (2002).
177. Patterson, supra note 175, at 856 (citing RAYMOND SALEILLES, DE LA
DÉCLARATION DE VOLONTÉ § 89, at 229–30 (Raymond Saleilles trans., 1901)).
178. Zev J. Eigen, Empirical Studies of Contract, 8 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI.
291, 299 (2012) (citing BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS
(Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007)).
179. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346–47 (2011) (citations omitted).
180. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts,
and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003) (explaining the efficiency of standard form contracts).
181. Cf. Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 233 (2002) (explaining the characteristics of consumer contracts).
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agree to these form contracts as a precondition to employment.182
Research has shown that many adults are incapable of comprehending the contents of these contracts or picking out the important provisions within the contracts.183 Further, drafting parties sometimes deliberately structure their contracts to
discourage the non-drafting party from reading or objecting to
the terms of the contract.184 Of course the fact that the non-drafting party often does not read the contract does not render the
contract invalid, but it does severely undermine the idea that
these contracts are bargained-for manifestations of mutual assent.
Another basic contractual principle which is often rendered
inapplicable when it comes to arbitration clauses is unconscionability. The doctrine of unconscionability reflects a recognition
that contracts are sometimes so unfair that the only possible explanation for the imbalance in terms is some sort of intrinsic
fraud.185 The unconscionability doctrine has been called “the primary check on drafter overreaching,”186 giving it special primacy
with regard to contracts of adhesion. The unconscionability doctrine varies slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but establishing unconscionability usually requires a showing of both procedural unconscionability (some form of oppression through
unequal bargaining power) and substantive unconscionability
(contract terms that produce “overly harsh” or “one-sided” results).187 It is generally easy to establish procedural unconscionability for adhesive contracts that are offered on a take-it-or-

182. Sarah E. Belton & F. Paul Bland, Jr., How the Arbitration-at-All-Costs
Regime Ignores and Distorts Settled Law, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 135,
150 (2014).
183. White & Mansfield, supra note 181, at 239–40. Comprehension assumes that the contracting party reads the contract; empirical studies show that
the non-drafting party is unlikely to have read the contract before “assenting”
to it. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1983).
184. See Sternlight, supra note 15, at 1648–49 (citing Ting v. AT&T, 182 F.
Supp. 2d 902, 911–13 (N.D. Cal. 2002)).
185. John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U.
PA. L. REV. 931, 937 n.20 (1969) (noting that one of the earliest references to
unconscionability rested heavily on an analogy to fraud).
186. David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 388
(2012).
187. See Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal
Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 48 (2006) (citations omitted).
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leave-it basis, since the non-drafting party lacks real choice regarding contractual terms, and sometimes whether or not to enter into the contract in the first place.188 Sometimes being forced
to arbitrate claims at all can be enough to establish substantive
unconscionability.189
Unconscionability thus appears to be a contract law principle that is almost tailor-made to address unfair arbitration
clauses. In fact, unconscionability was used so often to strike
down arbitration provisions that the doctrine became closely associated with arbitration.190 However, while unconscionability
had before been considered a general contract defense that
would fit within the § 2 savings clause of the FAA, when the doctrine of unconscionability became so closely associated with arbitration it started to seem less like a general contractual defense and more like a specialized tool to attack arbitration, thus
removing it from the savings clause.191 The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion thus signaled a death knell for the ability of
courts to freely apply unconscionability to arbitration clauses.192
Finally, the public policy defense, despite appearing to make
sense to apply to arbitration, has been rendered inapplicable to
agreements to arbitrate. This doctrine of refusing to enforce contracts that are against public policy is, similar to unconscionability, aimed at protecting the public good and promoting fairness.193 Even if a contract is properly entered into, it may be
invalidated by a court if it is found to be contrary to public policy.194 The source of this public policy through which a contract
may be invalidated can be statutes, regulations, prior case law
proclaiming policy precedent, or through the court’s “reasoning

188. Id. at 59.
189. See Yongdan Li, Applying the Doctrine of Unconscionability to Employment Arbitration Agreements, with Emphasis on Class Action/Arbitration
Waivers, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 665, 673 (2010).
190. See Horton, supra note 186, at 393.
191. Id. at 394.
192. Id.
193. See 15 GRACE MCLANE GIELSEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 79.1 (Joseph
M. Perillo ed. 2003) (“[F]reedom of contract is not an absolute right or superior
to the general welfare of the public. [Rather,] it is subject to reasonable restraint
and regulation by the state, under the police power, to protect the safety, health,
morals, and general welfare of the people.” (quoting South Dakota v. Nuss, 114
N.W.2d 633, 635 (1962))).
194. Id.
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not convincingly or completely adumbrated.”195 While it would
appear that the public policy defense would often be relevant
when dealing with mandatory arbitration clauses, similar to the
use of unconscionability, most arbitration-related uses of the
public policy doctrine did not survive the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion.196
The upshot of the discussion in this section is that basic contractual principles have often been disregarded in the context of
enforcing mandatory arbitration. This trend means that “contract law threatens to be less of a body of true law—with rules
and limits—and more [of] a device for the powerful drafters of
contracts to demand and receive whatever they want.”197 The
consent of the non-drafting party to these terms is effectively involuntary, since they often have no other alternatives.198 Despite
attempts by states to avoid knee-jerk automatic enforcement of
arbitration provisions, such attempts have largely been foreclosed upon by the Supreme Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence.199
Thus, taking any one of the few doctrines explained above
and applying it to a typical employer-employee contract would
likely render an arbitration provision contained therein invalid.
However, as explained above, for various reasons these doctrines
have been become inapplicable to arbitration provisions. Consequently, an effective solution to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in employment contracts cannot rely on bare applications of these doctrines by courts.
B. STATE ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT MANDATORY ARBITRATION ARE
OFTEN PREEMPTED BY THE FAA
States that wish to ameliorate the harsh effects of mandatory arbitration face the FAA preemption problem. Although
contract law is regarded as the prerogative of the states,200 the
195. David Adam Friedman, Bring Order to Contracts Against Public Policy,
39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 564, 565 (quoting M. P. Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal
Contracts, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 267, 308 (1966)).
196. See Horton, supra note 38, at 1238.
197. Belton & Bland, supra note 182, at 150.
198. Stephen A. Plass, Reforming the Federal Arbitration Act To Equalize
the Adjudication Rights of Powerful and Weak Parties, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 79,
96 (2015).
199. See infra Part II.B.
200. See Brief for Contract Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Supporting Respondent, Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2018) (No. 17-988).
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Supreme Court has progressively built up what some call a federal common law regarding arbitration,201 frequently displacing
state laws governing contracts. Since mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions in consumer and employee contracts produce unjust results, it is no surprise that various states have
crafted laws, rules, or policies designed to eliminate, curtail, or
soften the harsh effects of arbitration. Many states have passed
legislation restricting the use of mandatory arbitration in certain contexts or establishing rules regarding contract formation
in contracts with mandatory arbitration clauses.202 Additionally,
many state courts have gone out of their way to lessen the sometimes harsh impact of mandatory arbitration.203 Unfortunately,
many of these state-crafted rules to deal with mandatory arbitration have been invalidated by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA’s preemptive impact.204
Many states have passed laws intended to shield their citizens from mandatory pre-dispute arbitration by limiting the use
of arbitration provisions or trying to eliminate mandatory arbitration altogether. For example, Montana enacted a statute that
declared arbitration clauses unenforceable unless it was underlined and in capital letters on the first page of the contract.205
When a franchisee brought a suit against a franchisor, the Montana Supreme Court held that the arbitration clause contained
within their contract was unenforceable since it was not underlined nor on the first page of the contract.206 The Supreme Court,
201. See, e.g., Kenneth F. Dunham, Sailing Around Erie: The Emergence of
a Federal General Common Law of Arbitration, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 197,
227 (2006) (“Southland removed the lid from a Pandora’s Box of possibilities for
enforcement of arbitration under the FAA because it created a federal common
law with regard to arbitration.”); Isham R. Jones, The Federal Arbitration Act
and Section 2’s “Involving Commerce” Requirement: The Final Step Towards
Complete Federal Preemption over State Law and Policy – Allied-Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 327, 335 (explaining how Southland v.
Keating initiated the process of preempting state laws).
202. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114 (2019).
203. For example, in Picardi v. Eighth Judicial District Court, the Nevada
Supreme Court invalidated a class-arbitration waiver to further a range of state
interests, including deterring corporate wrongdoing and resolving claims efficiently. 251 P.3d 723 (Nev. 2011). Likewise, in Feeney v. Dell Inc., the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a class-arbitration waiver violated the Commonwealth’s “strong commitment to consumer protection legislation.” 908
N.E.2d 753, 765 (Mass. 2009).
204. See supra Part I.B.
205. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4).
206. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1994).

2020]

MANDATORY ARBITRATION

2541

however, reversed, holding that the Montana statute was
preempted by the FAA.207 The majority opinion noted that the
Montana statute singles out arbitration clauses and thus does
not fall within the § 2 savings clause since it is not a ground for
revocation of any contract.208 Another example is Concepcion.209
It is important to note the marked shift in these cases; even
though the Montana statute and California’s Discover Bank rule
are generally applicable contract defenses, they are no longer
considered generally applicable when applied to mandatory arbitration clauses. The most impactful portion of Concepcion was
the shift from focusing on the text of the FAA savings clause to
focusing on accomplishing the FAA’s objectives.210 No longer is
the Court bound by the text of the FAA, but rather it is free to
decide the scope of FAA preemption based on which result would
best accomplish the goals of the FAA. The Court was clear that
no longer could arbitration clauses be invalidated by legal rules
that “apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from
the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”211 Nor could
rules which covertly accomplish the same objectives by disfavoring contracts that have the defining features of arbitration
agreements.212
One final example of the preemptive force of the FAA is
found in Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark.213
In Kindred, plaintiffs brought suit against the nursing home
that their family members resided at prior to passing away.214
Their suit alleged that the nursing home provided sub-standard
care, contributing to the death of their family members.215 At the
time the deceased had moved into the nursing home, plaintiffs
completed the paperwork, which included an agreement to arbitrate, under their powers of attorney.216 The nursing home
moved to dismiss the case based on the arbitration provisions
the plaintiffs signed, but the trial court ruled that the suit could

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996).
Id. at 687.
See supra Part I.B.2.
This is called the “purposivist shift.” See Horton, supra note 38, at 1244.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 333 (2011).
Id. at 342.
Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017).
Id. at 1425.
Id.
Id.
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proceed.217 The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, finding that
the arbitration agreements were invalid.218 The Kentucky Supreme Court stated that the right of access to the courts, rooted
in the state constitution, is “sacred” and “inviolate”219 and thus
a power of attorney does not enable a representative to waive
that right unless it does so explicitly.220 Since the power of attorney documents in this case did not expressly allow the representatives to enter into arbitration agreements, the Court held that
the rights to a trial could not be waived absent a clear statement
of authority to do so.221
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, where a unanimous court reversed.222 Following the trend towards preemption, the Court held that since the Kentucky Supreme Court’s
new rule was not generally applicable, but instead targeted arbitration, it was preempted by the FAA.223 The “clear-statement
rule” announced by the Kentucky Supreme Court failed to put
agreements to arbitrate on an equal plane as other contracts.224
According to the Court, Kentucky did exactly what Concepcion
forbade—adopting a legal rule that hinges on a primary characteristic of arbitration.225 The Court was unpersuaded by the Kentucky Supreme Court’s attempt to avoid preemption by framing
the rule as one of general applicability, pointing out that the
Kentucky Supreme Court’s proposed general applications of the
rule, such as waiving the right to worship freely, consent to an
arranged marriage, or bind to personal servitude, were outrageous.226 Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the FAA
applies only to contract enforcement, rather than contract formation.227 Adopting such a view of FAA preemption would, according to the Court, “make it trivially easy for States to undermine the Act—indeed, to wholly defeat it.”228

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman, 478 S.W.3d 306, 313 (Ky. 2015).
Id. at 330.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 332.
Kindred Nursing Ctrs., 137 S. Ct. at 1429.
Id.
Id. at 1426–27.
Id. at 1427.
Id. at 1427–28.
Id. at 1428.
Id.
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Critics have pointed out that the Supreme Court is often not
clear about the scope of FAA preemption.229 Two theories
abound: the “any-contract test” and the “total-preemption theory.”230 Using the any-contract test draws from the last two
words of the § 2 savings clause to strike down arbitration provisions under rules that apply to any contract.231 The common understanding is that this includes doctrines such as fraud, duress,
and mistake.232 However, Concepcion and other FAA preemption
cases have been seen as a “ringing endorsement of the totalpreemption theory.”233 Under the total-preemption theory, state
contract defenses are completely preempted and may almost
never be used to invalidate or render unenforceable an agreement to arbitrate.234 This theory is supported by the fact that
state legislatures rarely legislate in general terms. Instead, legislatures legislate to solve problems, and these problems typically afflict only slices of the population, leading to specialized
laws. Additionally, to allow states too much control over determining contract defenses that could be used to invalidate agreements to arbitrate would be to create the possibility of a “loophole the size of the [FAA] itself.”
Further evidence of the move towards total preemption lies
in the Court’s purposivist shift regarding FAA preemption.235
Some have argued that the Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence, and especially Concepcion, move beyond mere conflict
preemption into a new and more wide-ranging “impact preemption.”236 Impact preemption develops in a field without Congress
expressly mandating it and is free from many of the checks that
come into play with other types of federal preemption of state

229. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 38, at 1225.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1219.
232. Id. at 1220.
233. Id. at 1244.
234. See id. at 1220 (examining this theory as it relates to state public policy
defense); Sarath Sanga, A New Strategy for Regulating Arbitration, 113 NW. U.
L. REV. 1121, 1143 (2019) (“The Supreme Court has Catch 22-ed the savings
clause out of existence.”).
235. Horton, supra note 38, at 1223–24.
236. Kristen M. Blankley, Impact Preemption: A New Theory of Federal Arbitration Preemption, 67 FLA. L. REV. 711, 714–15 (2015).
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laws.237 For these reasons, it is considered a “dangerous expansion of federal power” and is regarded as “particularly ill suited
to the FAA.”238
Although total preemption seems to be the most popular
view of the current state of FAA preemption, some disagree.
Even though it is called an “extreme interpretation,” some believe that the fifth vote of Justice Thomas in Concepcion signaled
that the preemption doctrine may be limited to cases that arise
in federal courts.239 Others have argued that FAA preemption
has “never completely eclipsed” state contract law doctrines such
as public policy.240
In sum, the Supreme Court has augmented FAA preemption
to a degree where it threatens to eclipse state rules, if it has not
already done so. Through minimizing the scope of the savings
clause, the Court has effectively precluded state contract law
from invalidating arbitration provisions. As controversial as this
jurisprudence has been, it is precedential and unlikely to change
anytime soon.241 As such, any effective state solution to the arbitration-at-all-costs regime242 must find a way to thread a needle
through this thicket.
C. OTHER APPROACHES TO CURTAILING MANDATORY
ARBITRATION ARE EITHER UNLIKELY OR INEFFECTIVE
As with most problems, there are a host of possible solutions
to remedy the problem of mandatory arbitration. Unfortunately,
none of these are currently feasible or effective.
1. Federal Governmental Action
One of the easiest and most straightforward solutions would
be action by the federal government. All three branches of the

237. Id. at 714.
238. Id.
239. Michael A. Wolff, Is There Life After Concepcion? State Courts, State
Law, and the Mandate of Arbitration, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1269, 1276 (2012)
(reading Justice Thomas’s fifth vote to signal a more restrained preemption doctrine).
240. See Horton, supra note 38, at 1221 (citing instances where public policy
or unconscionability are still used to void arbitration agreements).
241. See infra Part II.C.
242. See Belton & Bland, supra note 182, at 138 (using the phrase “arbitration-at-all-costs regime” to describe the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence).
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federal government hold power to remedy the problem of widespread mandatory arbitration;243 however, action from any of
them appears unlikely.
Congress could amend the FAA to create additional exceptions or completely repeal it.244 Additionally, Congress could create causes of action and exempt those causes of action from arbitration. The Supreme Court has consistently stated that
Congress holds the power to render certain claims non-arbitrable.245 Although some progress has been made in chipping away
at mandatory arbitration, such as the Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibition of pre-dispute arbitration in residential mortgages,246 it is
unlikely that a general reform to the system of arbitration would
pass in the Senate in its current composition.247
The Supreme Court is an unlikely source of a solution, especially considering that the Court is one of the main causes of the
problem.248 The Court could reverse course at any time249 and
treat arbitration agreements more skeptically, but this is supremely unlikely to happen, especially considering the current
composition of the Court.250 Even though earlier arbitration
243. See Stephen J. Ware, The Politics of Arbitration Law and Centrist Proposals for Reform, 53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 711, 714 (2016).
244. Id.
245. Sternlight, supra note 15, at 1643.
246. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 1414(e)(1), 124 Stat. 2151 (2010) (“No residential mortgage loan
and no extension of credit under an open end consumer credit plan secured by
the principal dwelling of the consumer may include terms which require arbitration or any other nonjudicial procedure as the method for resolving any controversy or settling any claims arising out of the transaction.”).
247. See Ware, supra note 243, at 719 (noting that generally the left opposes
mandatory arbitration and the right supports it and noting that the Arbitration
Fairness Act was sponsored by twenty-four Democrats but zero Republicans).
248. See supra Part I.B.
249. Subject, of course, to principles of stare decisis.
250. See Ware, supra note 243, at 720 (noting that votes on major arbitration
cases tend to follow a “highly partisan voting pattern” where justices appointed
by Republican presidents favor arbitration and justices appointed by Democratic presidents disfavor arbitration); Bleemer et al., supra note 18 (noting that
Kavanaugh “leans hard toward business arguments and away from employees’
interests”); Adam Liptak, In His First Supreme Court Opinion, Justice Brett
Kavanaugh Favors Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes
.com/2019/01/08/us/politics/supreme-court-brett-kavanaugh-opinion.html
[https://perma.cc/9Y5S-KN6L] (detailing Justice Kavanaugh’s pro-arbitration
bent); Oliver Roeder, How Long Will the Supreme Court’s Conservative Bloc Survive?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 19, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
how-long-will-the-supreme-courts-conservative-bloc-survive/ [https://perma.cc/
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cases garnered broader support amongst the justices, the current Republican-appointed judges now “seem farther from the
political center on law governing adhesive arbitration agreements.”251
Although federal legislative action and the Supreme Court
reversing course seem unlikely, the executive branch, through
agency action, could theoretically provide a solution to mandatory arbitration.252 Upon closer examination, this avenue can be
shown to be unlikely and fickle. Remember that Epic Systems253
concerned an agency action.254 When the case reached the Supreme Court, the agency’s rule was rejected, resolving the apparent conflict between the FAA and the NLRB’s rule in favor of
the FAA.255
Yet, the NLRB is not alone in terms of agencies that have
the power to curtail mandatory pre-dispute arbitration. The
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has express authorization to create rules to restrict mandatory pre-dispute arbitration.256 In July 2017, the CFPB proposed a new rule that
would have prohibited “providers of certain consumer financial
products and services” from using mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses and would require disclosure of arbitration records for those entities who were covered but still allowed to conduct arbitration.257 Unfortunately, before the rule could become
final, Congress passed a joint resolution disapproving of the rule

TJ9K-U485] (noting that most expect the Supreme Court to remain solidly conservative for decades to come).
251. Ware, supra note 243, at 720.
252. See, e.g., Daniel T. Deacon, Agencies and Arbitration, 117 COLUM. L.
REV. 991, 993–95 (2017) (exploring how agencies can play a role in mandatory
arbitration, especially in the consumer and employment contexts); Ware, supra
note 243, at 714.
253. See supra Part I.B.
254. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018).
255. Id.
256. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 921, 124 Stat. 1841, 1841 (2010).
257. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 (proposed July 19, 2017);
CFPB Issues Rule to Ban Companies from Using Arbitration Clauses to Deny
Groups of People Their Day in Court, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,
(July 10, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb
-issues-rule-ban-companies-using-arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-people-their
-day-court/ [https://perma.cc/58AH-NX4F].
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and President Trump signed the resolution, nullifying the proposed rule.258
A similar example of how administrative action in this
realm is insufficient is the fluctuating level of enforcement
through the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor. During the final days of George W. Bush’s second term, the
Labor Department issued numerous opinion letters which provided guidance to employers about how they planned to enforce
wage and hour laws.259 These guidance letters were considered
to be pro-business in that they softened rules regarding pay for
overtime as well as other wage and hour issues.260 President
Obama rescinded these letters immediately when he took office
in 2009.261 President Trump, in addition to cutting funding for
the Labor Department,262 reversed course and reinstated these
letters.263 The upshot of both this example and the CFPB example is that while agency action to enforce wage and hour laws or
stem mandatory arbitration can be helpful, they are often insufficient due to their fickleness and their ability to change with
each administration. No lasting solution to this problem can be
forged through agency action.
2. Past State Attempts To Limit Mandatory Arbitration
Some states have attempted to limit or prohibit the use of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration. New York has prohibited
258. H.R.J. Res. 111, 115th Cong. (2017); Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed.
Reg. 55,500 (Nov. 22, 2017); Patricia A. McCoy, Inside Job: The Assault on the
Structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 103 MINN. L. REV.
2543, 2570 (2019).
259. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR DIV., FLSA2009-1 TO
FLSA2009-36 (2009), https://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/search/index.htm?FLSA
[https://perma.cc/8GL6-9WHE]; Juliet Eilperin, The Trump Administration
Just Changed Its Overtime Guidance—and Business Cheers, WASH. POST (Jan.
8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-trump-administration
-just-changed-its-overtime-guidance--and-business-cheers/2018/01/08/f00d3eee
-f4a6-11e7-beb6-c8d48830c54d_story.html [https://perma.cc/GHT4-SW9M].
260. See Eilperin, supra note 259 (explaining that the guidance letters are
“another example of how this administration is siding with big business to make
it harder to get paid for working overtime and to make it easier for companies
to reap the benefits of young workers’ labor without paying a cent for it”).
261. Id.
262. Ben Penn, Trump’s 20 Percent Cut in Labor Budget Aims at Job Training, BLOOMBERG L. (May 23, 2017), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor
-report/trumps-20-percent-cut-in-labor-budget-aims-at-job-training [https://
perma.cc/58BX-ZFVY].
263. See Eilperin, supra note 259.
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mandating arbitration of workplace sexual harassment
claims.264 This law seems to fit squarely within the group of laws
that expressly prohibit arbitration in a certain context and is
thus likely to be preempted by the FAA.265 California’s Assembly
and Senate passed a bill that would have prohibited all mandatory arbitration in employment contracts,266 though this bill was
vetoed by Governor Jerry Brown, who cited the fact that this bill
would be preempted under the Supreme Court’s FAA preemption regime.267 A similar attempt was made in Vermont, when
both chambers of the state’s legislatures passed a bill that would
have made standard form contracts containing an arbitration
clause presumptively unconscionable.268 This bill was vetoed by
Governor Philip Scott, who cited the concerns of business groups
as his reason for vetoing the bill.269 However, even if this bill had
been signed by the Governor and was found not to be preempted
by the FAA,270 it would have provided minimal protections to
employees.271

264. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7515 (CONSOL. 2018).
265. Cf. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (holding California’s Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA); see also Doctor’s
Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 681–82 (1996) (invalidating a Montana state
statute prohibiting mandating arbitration as conflicting with the FAA).
266. Assemb. B. 3080, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
267. David G. Hagopian, Governor Vetoes AB 3080—Says Banning Employment Arbitration Agreements Violates Federal Law, CAL. LAB. & EMP’T. L. BLOG,
https://www.callaborlaw.com/entry/governor-vetoes-ab-3080says-banning
-employment-arbitration-agreements-violates-federal-law [https://perma.cc/
CMC4-745C]. Governor Gavin Newsom later signed a bill into law that addresses mandatory arbitration clauses; however, this law is probably too narrow
to have any real effect. See Scott P. Jang & Samia M. Kirmani, New California
Law Attacks Mandatory Arbitration Again . . . But Is It More Bark than Bite?,
JACKSON LEWIS (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/new
-california-law-attacks-mandatory-arbitration-again-it-more-bark-bite [https://
perma.cc/AGK6-BV53].
268. S. 105, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018).
269. JOURNAL OF THE S., S. 2036–38 (Vt. 2018).
270. It is also likely that this statute would have been preempted, since it
closely resembles previous attempts to use unconscionability to soften the impact of mandatory arbitration.
271. The bill seemingly would not have even prevented arbitration. If anything, it could have forced companies to provide more friendly arbitration, but
it would not have eliminated mandatory arbitration in employment contracts.
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3. Scholarly Proposals
Beyond these more straightforward governmental actions,
many scholars have proposed other ways of stemming mandatory pre-dispute arbitration.272 While these ideas are generally
helpful, their effects may be more temporary or less effective
than the solution proposed in Part III of this Note.
For example, Sarath Sanga has argued that states should
focus more on deterring arbitration clauses rather than enforcing (or not enforcing) them.273 Sanga argues that rather than relying on contract enforcement, states should deter the formation
of such contracts in the first place.274 By focusing on deterring
the formation of contracts that include mandatory arbitration
clauses, Sanga argues, states can circumvent the preemption issues regarding acting in contracts.275 The fatal flaw to this approach is that it fails to address the root problem and the reason
why employers can insert mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in their contracts in the first place—the gargantuan disparity in bargaining power. Would-be employees would likely
fear retaliation or other ill-effects and may be prevented from
reporting for these reasons. As discussed earlier,276 employment
contracts are almost always offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Employees would presumably be forced to “leave it” to report an
employer whose contract had an arbitration clause. This is, of
course, assuming the employee in this situation is even aware of
the illegality of including a mandatory arbitration clause and the
reward offered for blowing the whistle on the employer. Additionally, some employers, especially large ones, may treat the
fine more as a fee, and choose to simply pay the fine.277 The risk
272. E.g., Stephen A. Plass, Federal Arbitration Law and the Preservation of
Legal Remedies, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 213 (2018); Sanga, supra note 234, at 1152.
273. See Sanga, supra note 234, at 1121.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1127.
276. See supra Part I.A.
277. Cf. Darlene R. Wong, Stigma: A More Efficient Alternative to Fines in
Deterring Corporate Misconduct, 3 CAL. J. CRIM. L. REV. 3, ¶ 2 (2000) (“‘Pay to
pollute’ dynamics result when predictable fines allow corporations to consider
even punitive damages as fixed costs, thereby rendering the fining system ineffective.”); Patricia Cohen, When Company Is Fined, Taxpayers Often Share Bill,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/business/when
-a-company-is-fined-taxpayers-often-share-the-punishment.html (explaining
that corporate fines are often written off on the company’s taxes, shifting the
burden to taxpayers); David Gillen, Video: A Year of Corporate Fines, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 30, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/30/business/video-a
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of enforcement multiplied by the fine may be less than the financial benefit to the employer by staying out of court. The fine
would have to be set at a point where it would still have a deterring effect.
Another potential solution involves ensuring that a substantive remedy for employees is preserved.278 This solution rests on
the idea that the Supreme Court’s evolution of its preference for
arbitration occurred on the assumption that arbitration would
serve as a “fair adjudicatory alternative.”279 Of course, considering the current widespread use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions,280 this is no longer always the case. One way
to reconcile this is to restructure the “effective vindication”
rule.281 The effective vindication principle helped the Court move
towards its current arbitration-friendly position by noting that
as long as claims can be vindicated in an arbitral forum, no substantive claims are lost.282 The Court, as we know, later retreated from the effective vindication rule,283 but if the Court
were to return to it, many arbitration provisions of the type that
are discussed in this Note would become invalid.284 While this
would be a satisfying and just result, it is extremely unlikely.285
Others have proposed solutions to the effects of employees
signing mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements, such as
the inability to pursue wage theft claims.286 For instance,
Nantiya Ruan has argued for increased enforcement of wage and
hour claims, the establishment of a wage and hour claims court,
and increased education about wage and hour claims for employees.287 Although increased enforcement is currently unlikely and

-year-of-corporate-fines.html (noting that many companies view fines as a cost
of doing business).
278. See Plass, supra note 272, at 273.
279. Id.
280. See supra Part I.C.
281. See Plass, supra note 272, at 274–76.
282. See id. at 264 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
283. Id. at 263.
284. Id. at 275.
285. See supra Part II.C.
286. E.g., Nantiya Ruan, What’s Left To Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration Mandates that Bar Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 1103, 1139–44 (2012).
287. See id.
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generally a fickle solution,288 Ruan’s other solutions are quite interesting. She proposes “changing the forum to fit the need,”289
which includes making arbitration friendlier to low-wage workers and establishing a wage claims court.290 In Ruan’s proposals
for making arbitration friendlier to low-wage workers, she suggests making the terms of arbitration more generous to employees (ironically, she notes, similar to the terms in Concepcion) and
allowing non-lawyer advocates in arbitration through the relaxation of regulations related to the unauthorized practice of
law.291 In addition, Ruan argues that the establishment of wage
claims courts, which would be modeled after small claims courts,
would help resolve wage claims “quickly and efficiently.”292 This
approach could be pursued on the state or federal level.293 While
this solution seems unlikely, Ruan argues that it could materialize “if spearheaded by a collaboration of worker organizations,
unions, practitioners, and scholars.”294
Others have suggested that establishing a third-party liability regime for wage and hour violations would remedy the problem of wage theft.295 While this solution may help remedy the
problem of wage theft, it does not address the fact that even if
third-party liability was imposed on a company, the claims
would still need to be arbitrated if the employer and employee
had agreed to arbitrate.
In sum, an impactful and lasting solution to the problem of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses is necessary to protect low-wage workers from wage theft and other employmentrelated harms. Such a solution is proposed in the following section.
III. A STATE-BASED SOLUTION TO THE MANDATORY
ARBITRATION PROBLEM THAT AVOIDS FAA
PREEMPTION
Any attempt at dealing a blow to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses through state legislative and judicial action
288. See supra Part II.C.
289. See Ruan, supra note 286, at 1141.
290. See id. at 1141–46.
291. Id. at 1142–43.
292. Id. at 1144.
293. Id. at 1145.
294. Id. at 1146.
295. See, e.g., Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft,
31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2010).
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must be aware of the various pitfalls and traps inherent in such
a fix.296 While some believe that the current FAA preemption regime leaves no avenues through which states may curtail or ban
arbitration provisions,297 there is simply too much at stake to not
exhaust every possible remedy to this problem. Even if the solution posed below has a slight chance of success, the scope of those
who would benefit and the degree to which the solution would
make it easier for them to have their claims vindicated mandates
that every possible avenue that may eliminate mandatory predispute arbitration be pursued.
State law has long provided the rules of interpretation to
understand contracts.298 Although the Court has strayed away
from this doctrine in its FAA preemption jurisprudence,299 the
principle remains. Considering the unlikelihood of action at the
federal level,300 state action is the best bet for an impactful solution. However, as we have seen time and time again, the Court’s
FAA preemption regime leaves little wiggle room to weave a
state solution.301
As such, states should enact statutes that define a set of contractual terms and mandate that these terms be highlighted or
otherwise brought to the attention of the accepting party. State
courts should then interpret these statutes in a way where they
apply not only to arbitration (the chief target of the statutes), but
also to other provisions, as to avoid FAA preemption. Enacting
these statutes and interpreting them in this way will foster
awareness of the contents of the adhesive contracts and will ensure that true mutual assent exists between the parties.

296. See supra Part II.
297. See Sanga, supra note 234, at 1143.
298. See Brief for Contract Law Scholars as Amici Curiae, supra note 200.
299. See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421,
1426 (2017) (finding that courts may not invalidate an arbitration agreement
on legal rules that “apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from
the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue” (citing AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 342 (2011))); Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S.
681, 687 (1996) (discussing how courts may not invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws which are applicable only to arbitration provisions).
300. See supra Part II.C.
301. See Plass, supra note 278, at 237 (“The new federal rules of preemption
have nullified state laws that enforce arbitration contracts but provide contract
defenses designed to limit oppression and unfair surprise embedded at the formation stage.”).
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A. LESSONS FROM STATES’ PAST FAILED ATTEMPTS
Any state solution must navigate the potential preemption
problem. The solution must not “derive [its] meaning from the
fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”302 An informative
example of a state trying to do this, but failing, is provided in
Kindred.303 Although the Kentucky Supreme Court nominally
attempted to base its holding on a generally applicable contract
rule, the Supreme Court considered this “clear statement rule” a
pretext used to disfavor arbitration.304 The fatal flaw in the Kentucky Supreme Court’s effort to avoid the long reach of the Supreme Court’s FAA preemption regime was, in the words of the
Supreme Court, “adopt[ing] a legal rule hinging on the primary
characteristic of an arbitration agreement—namely, a waiver of
the right to go to court and receive a jury trial.”305 The Court did
not believe the Kentucky Supreme Court’s explanation that this
was in fact a general contractual principle since this clear statement rule would also apply to other “fundamental constitutional
rights,” such as the right to worship freely, consent to an arranged marriage, or bind the principal to servitude, among others.306 Far from being convinced that this passes muster to avoid
preemption, the Supreme Court called these examples a “slim
set of both patently objectionable and utterly fanciful contracts”307 and analogized them to a black swan.308 Notably, however, the Court goes out of its way to reiterate that it leaves the
door open for state courts to announce new, generally applicable
rules in an arbitration case, so long as those rules truly apply
generally, rather than singling out the unique aspects of arbitration.309
A couple lessons can be learned from Kindred in developing
a workable solution to mandatory arbitration in employment
contracts. First, a lot can be learned from the mistakes made by
the Kentucky Supreme Court. These mistakes include announcing the rule for the first time in this case, especially applying the

302. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).
303. See Kindred Nursing Ctrs., 137 S. Ct. at 1421; supra Part I.B.
304. Kindred Nursing Ctrs., 137 S. Ct. at 1426–27.
305. Id. at 1427.
306. Id. at 1426 (citing Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman, 478 S.W.3d
306, 328 (Ky. 2015)).
307. Id. at 1427.
308. Id. at 1428.
309. Id. at 1428 n.2.
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rule to arbitration before applying it to other “fundamental constitutional rights” that it claimed the rule would also apply to.310
Second, one could argue that the clear statement rule was either
too narrow or too broad. It was too narrow in the sense that there
are few other fundamental constitutional rights which one would
normally waive in a contract. This led to the far-fetched and
strange examples given by the Kentucky Supreme Court.311 On
the other hand, the clear statement rule, if applied consistently,
would include many clauses in “routine contracts” that are “executed day in and day out.”312 This overbreadth allowed the Supreme Court to pierce the Kentucky Supreme Court’s pretextual
veil by pointing out that if this new rule were strictly followed,
it would sweep too broadly to be practicable.313
Other state attempts have been even cruder than the Kentucky Supreme Court’s in Kindred. For instance, in Marmet
Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, the Supreme Court summarily reversed the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decision that held arbitration of personal injury or wrongful death
claims violate public policy.314 This was a straightforward case
for the Court to decide considering the rule that when state law
prohibits the arbitration of certain claims, that state law is displaced by the FAA.315 The lesson from Marmet is simple: the
state law must not outrightly prohibit arbitration of any certain
type of claim.316
Another source to draw from when considering how to craft
a state law solution is the well-intentioned but ill-fated attempt
made by the Vermont Legislature in 2018.317 Drafters initially
stated that their aim was “to prohibit forced arbitration of consumer disputes.”318 While it is not clear whether a court would
310. Id. at 1427.
311. Id. at 1426.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 1427.
314. See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 534 (2012)
(per curiam).
315. Id. at 533.
316. Therefore, an outright prohibition of mandatory arbitration in employment contracts is not a workable solution.
317. S. 105, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018).
318. See Alison Frankel, How Can States Block Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses? Vermont May Have Found a Way, REUTERS (May 14, 2018), https://
www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-vermont/how-can-states-block-mandatory
-arbitration-clauses-vermont-may-have-found-a-way-idUSKCN1IF2R3 [https://
perma.cc/84HG-HZDU].
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take legislative history like this into account when determining
whether the statute is preempted by the FAA, it is hard to imagine even the most textualist members of the Supreme Court not
using this as ammunition to strike down the statute, even if the
text were sufficiently generally applicable.
The other lesson that the Vermont attempt teaches is that
the state statute must actually be effective. The Vermont bill
does many things, including prohibiting resolution of a claim
that takes place in an inconvenient venue,319 prohibiting waiver
of rights to assert statutory claims,320 prohibiting waiver of one’s
right to seek punitive damages, and prohibiting arbitration being more costly to the individual than seeking a judicial remedy
would have been.321 However, even if contract drafters obeyed
these provisions, the best case scenario is that consumers would
face a friendlier version of arbitration, which is, after all, still
arbitration. Doing away with some of the worst and most unjust
aspects of arbitration does nothing to resolve the fact that even
a friendlier version of arbitration is still immensely harmful to
employees seeking redress for a grievance.322
With these lessons in mind, we can begin to sketch out what
a workable and effective solution might look like. The best bet,
considering states’ past failed attempts at using the doctrines of
unconscionability and public policy, is to focus on other aspects
of contract formation and to ensure that the new rule is broad
enough to apply not only to arbitration, but also to other contractual terms.
B. WHAT STATES SHOULD DO (LEGISLATIVELY AND JUDICIALLY)
As discussed above, the non-drafting party is often unaware
of the contractual terms in an adhesive contract.323 Although
there is typically a duty to read a contract and know its contents,
expecting a contract adherent to do this is not always realistic,
and this duty must be squared with another core contract law
principle—the requirement of mutual assent.324 Adhesive contracts often offend the notion of bargained-for-exchange that is
often assumed to exist in all contracts. Courts sometimes rely on
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

S. 105 § 6055(a)(1), 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018).
Id. § 6055(a)(2).
Id. § 6055(a)(5).
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part I.A.
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basic contractual principles when posed with a new contract law
issue.325 Courts should use the same approach to deal with the
numerous issues posed by adhesive contracts. Using this approach is one way to curtail the use and abuse of mandatory arbitration. To effect this reinvigoration and return to basic common law contract principles, state legislatures should mandate
this return. In order to craft an effective statute, we must determine both (1) which terms will be covered by the statute and
(2) how the statute will treat these terms.
1. Identifying Which Contractual Provisions Would Be
Covered by the Rule
The first step is considering which contractual terms would
be covered by such a statute. To have the statute reach every
term in every contract would almost certainly be unwieldy, inefficient, and unnecessary. Instead, state legislatures should focus
on a narrower set of terms. Additionally, it is important to keep
in mind that enumerating the exact contractual terms that
would be covered (arbitration clauses, for example) would likely
lead to the statute being preempted by the FAA.326 One way to
strike this balance is to take a results-oriented approach and focus on effects of certain clauses. For instance, the statute could
be written in a way where it would cover all contractual terms
that have the effect of curtailing the rights of the non-drafting
party. Worded this way, the statute would cover arbitration
clauses and other clauses that limit the rights of the adhering
party without being overly broad. The statute would then cover
choice of law provisions (curtailing the party’s right to be governed by the law where the contract was signed), restrictions of
liability (curtailing the party’s rights to redress), unreasonable
liquidated damages provisions (curtailing the party’s right to be
free from unreasonable damages and the right to efficient
breach), non-compete agreements (curtailing the right to work
elsewhere) and, most importantly for the purpose of this Note,

325. See, e.g., Berkson v. Gogo, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 402–06 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(applying basic common law contractual principles to deal with issues posed by
e-contracting).
326. The application of the statute to arbitration would almost certainly be
preempted by the FAA if arbitration clauses were enumerated in the statute.

2020]

MANDATORY ARBITRATION

2557

mandatory arbitration provisions (curtailing the right to seek redress in a judicial forum, or, in some cases, to seek redress at
all).327
Another approach would be to use other jurisdictions’ unfair
contract terms rules to inform which terms will be covered by
this statute. The United Kingdom’s Consumer Rights Act regulates terms in consumer contracts and renders “unfair terms” not
binding on the consumer.328 The Act defines an unfair term as
one which “causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights
and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer.”329 Mandatory arbitration of claims is included in the
schedule of terms that may be regarded as unfair.330 Previous
iterations of this rule limited “unfair terms” to those which were
not negotiated;331 however, this requirement was abrogated in
the 2015 version.332 The European Union has a similar rule that
defines an unfair term as one that was not individually negotiated and “causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights
and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of
the consumer.”333 Similar to the UK rule, the EU rule only
reaches consumer contracts.334 Other examples abound of countries having similar rules governing unfair contractual terms in
adhesive contracts.335 The statute proposed here could use the
same criteria for determining which terms are covered, but

327. As would be the case in the types of claims that would only make financial sense to bring as a class action. See supra Part I.B.2.
328. Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 15 § 61–76 (U.K.).
329. Id. § 62(4).
330. Id. at sched. 2(20). Other examples include liability-limiting terms, unfair liquidated damages provisions, and terms that purport to allow for unilateral modification of the contract.
331. The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 § 5(2)
(U.K.).
332. COMPETITION AND MARKET AUTHORITY, UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS
GUIDANCE ANNEX B: INDEX TO MAIN REFERENCES IN THE GUIDANCE TO NEW
ELEMENTS OF UNFAIR TERMS LAW INTRODUCED BY THE CONSUMER RIGHTS ACT
AS OF 1 OCTOBER 2015 (2015), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/450414/Unfair_
Terms_Annex_B_-__post_comms.pdf.
333. Council Directive 93/13/EEC, art. 3, 1993 O.J. (L 95/29) 1 (EC).
334. Id. at pmbl.
335. See, e.g., Sinai Deutch, Control of Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts
in Israel: Law and Practice, 13 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 181, 184–97 (1990) (discussing Israel’s rule).
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should, for obvious reasons,336 avoid enumerating arbitrationspecific terms.
One final approach to determining which terms will be covered by this statute would be to distinguish between “visible”
and “invisible” terms in an adhesive contract.337 Visible terms
are those which bargained for and those which a “customary
shopper”338 would be expected to have shopped around for.339
The price term is considered the paradigmatic example of a visible term.340 Invisible terms are all the rest of the terms. Considering what we know about mandatory arbitration provisions,341
they would almost certainly be considered an invisible term in
an adhesive employment contract. The proposed statute could
apply to invisible terms in adhesive contracts.
It is beyond the scope of this Note to decide which of these
approaches would be best for a state to use. Instead, deciding
which terms will be covered by such a statute should be a policy
decision that is left up to the states. As long as the statute is
broad enough to cover arbitration provisions and does not single
out arbitration, any one of these approaches would be adequate
to address the problem. However, merely determining what
terms will be covered by the statute is inadequate. The next subpart explores the question of how these terms should be treated
to ensure true mutual assent between the adhering party and
the drafting party.
2. What Should Be Done with These Provisions?
Now that we have defined what terms could be covered by
this statute, the next thing to determine is how the statute will
treat these terms. Given the fact that completely eliminating
these terms would not be practicable,342 the solution must be
something short of an outright prohibition on these terms. One
336. See supra Part II.B.
337. Rakoff, supra note 183, at 1250–55 (drawing the distinction between
visible and invisible terms and explaining this taxonomy).
338. A customary shopper can be thought of as a reasonable person seeking
to enter into a contract, usually an adhesive one. Id. at 1252–53.
339. Id. at 1251.
340. Id.
341. See supra Part II.A.
342. Liability waivers are a good example of a term that some contract drafters absolutely rely upon. Some businesses would cease to exist if there were an
outright ban on those provisions. Such an approach would also offend the freedom to contract. See Edwards, supra note 169, at 647.
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possibility is that these terms are singled out and must require
some additional showing of assent on the part of the non-drafting
party. This solution would address the problem that these invisible terms are rarely assented to by the non-drafting party.
Such a solution calls to mind the Montana Legislature’s attempt that was held to be preempted by the FAA in Casarotto.343
Specifically, the statute required that any contract subject to arbitration must provide notice of that fact on the first page of the
contract in underlined capital letters.344 It is probably safe to
guess that the Montana legislature was seeking to foster awareness of arbitration clauses by enacting this statute, much the
same as the solution proposed here is seeking to do. The critical
difference, however, is that the Montana statute singled out arbitration specifically in the statute, whereas the solution proposed herein is of general applicability and is therefore considerably more likely to survive FAA preemption.
As this solution hinges on ensuring the non-drafting party
truly assents to the adhesive contract, it would be helpful to step
back to define what assent would mean in this context. First, for
the non-drafting party to truly assent to the term, that party
must know that the term is in the contract. It is unlikely that
the non-drafting party has read the contract, and even if they
have, they are unlikely to have understood it.345 That shows that
while knowledge of the presence of a term in a contract is a necessary element of true assent, it is not sufficient. The non-drafting party must also be able to understand the term. Finally, even
if the non-drafting party knows of the presence of the term and
nominally understands it, they may not fully understand the implications of the term, such as the procedural differences between arbitration and bringing a claim in court and how arbitration procedures may lend an advantage to the contract drafter.346
Assent, therefore, also requires at least a basic understanding of
the implications of the terms in the contract.
With those points in mind, this statute should identify a
mechanism that leads to the non-drafting party truly assenting
by making sure the party knows of the presence of the term, understands what it means, and understands the implications of
343. Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).
344. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995), invalidated by Casarotto, 517
U.S. 681.
345. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 183, at 1179; White & Mansfield, supra note
181, at 242.
346. See supra Part I.C.
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the term being present. This could be accomplished in a variety
of ways, including highlighting the terms in the contract, instituting mandatory readability requirements, requiring the terms
to be explained orally at the time of executing the contract, or
mandating inclusion of explanatory blurbs within the contract.
Some combination of these mechanisms would move the needle
in terms of awareness of the non-drafting party and bring adhesive contracts closer to being in line with foundational contractual principles. If these requirements are not followed, the terms
should be declared unenforceable.
3. Need for Legislative and Judicial Cooperation
Finally, it should be noted that state courts will be instrumental in instituting this new rule. It is critical, in order to avoid
FAA preemption, to ensure that the statute is applied generally
and evenly, rather than singling out arbitration. Being able to
point to cases where this statute was used in relation to contractual terms that do not involve arbitration would be immensely
helpful in proving to the Supreme Court, were this statute to be
challenged, that it is truly of general applicability and that it
does not draw its meaning from the fact that arbitration is at
issue.
For an example of an approach to avoid, state courts can look
to what the Kentucky Supreme Court did in Kindred.347 Specifically, the Kentucky Supreme Court announced a rule that the
Supreme Court rather easily snuffed out as targeting arbitration.348 Although the Kentucky Supreme Court claimed the rule
would apply to other contractual terms, these examples were
fanciful and far-fetched.349 State courts in states that would enact a statute similar to what is proposed herein should work diligently to ensure they are applying that statute not only to arbitration clauses, but also to other clauses that would be covered.
Doing this would be immensely helpful in withstanding FAA
preemption.

347. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017).
348. Id. at 1426–27.
349. The Supreme Court accused the Kentucky Supreme Court of “hypothesiz[ing] a slim set of both patently objectionable and utterly fanciful contracts”
such as those where a representative waives her principal’s right to worship
freely, consent to an arranged marriage, or bind her principal to personal servitude. Id. at 1427–28.
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C. ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS
The solution proposed in this Note will of course be subject
to some degree of skepticism. The most important criticism to
address is that this solution just won’t work. This argument is
likely to come from those who believe that there is no daylight in
the Supreme Court’s preemption regime through which to weave
a solution, sometimes called the total preemption theory.350
Those who subscribe to this view of FAA preemption would say
that if a state enacted a law like the one in Part III and it was
interpreted by a state court as applicable to arbitration clauses,
the Supreme Court would hold that the statute and interpretation would be preempted by the FAA, similar to what the Court
has done in many previous cases. Even though the statute would
be facially generally applicable and would have to be interpreted
as applying to contractual terms other than arbitration clauses,
if challenged, the Supreme Court may, consistent with its purposivist move in Concepcion,351 hold that applying the rule to arbitration clauses frustrates the purposes of the FAA and is thus
preempted as it applies to arbitration clauses.
To say that this view does not pose a very serious threat to
undermining the purpose of this solution would be disingenuous.
As has been proven time and time again, the Supreme Court has
a very strong preference for arbitration and will go to great
lengths to strike down rules which impede that preference. Even
though preemption is a serious threat, the solution proposed in
this Note traces some of the approaches used in previous attempts to curtail the use of mandatory arbitration clauses while
ironing out the kinks that ultimately made ruling these attempts
to be preempted relatively easy calls post-Concepcion.352 If there
is any room for a non-preempted solution to the use of mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration clauses, the solution proposed here is it.
Additionally, it is still unclear whether this is the correct
view of the scope of FAA preemption. It may be likely, but it has
yet to receive a full-throated, clear endorsement by the Supreme
Court. Considering the huge financial, social, and psychological

350. See Horton, supra note 38, at 1220.
351. See supra Part I.B.2.
352. E.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs., 137 S. Ct. at 1421 (a 7–1 decision); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 463 (2015) (6–3); Marmet Health Care
Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 530 (2012) (per curiam). Even some FAA
preemption cases before Concepcion were easy calls for the Court, such as Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (8–1).
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costs of the effects of mandatory arbitration in employment contracts, even if this solution has a marginal chance at being successful, it is worth it for states to pursue.
Another argument against this approach is that it would be
politically infeasible. Some state legislatures may be unlikely to
enact legislation that would curtail the use of arbitration.353
However, efforts in states like Vermont, New York, and California have shown that state legislatures have the political will to
pass bills aiming to curtail the use of mandatory arbitration in
adhesive contracts.354 It is true that the states’ governors vetoed
two of these attempts—one citing concern over preemption and
the other citing business concerns. This solution would remedy
the former concern, but not the latter. However, governors that
prefer to cater to business interests over protecting its most vulnerable citizens were never likely to endorse a solution like this
in the first place.
It is also possible that the solution proposed herein would be
seen as a rather transparent attempt to limit mandatory arbitration. This may be true, but, as discussed above, this proposal
is truly more far reaching. Although mandatory arbitration
clauses harm consumers and employees, they are far from the
only provisions that have this effect. Thus, the fact that this solution applies to those other terms means that it both offers more
protection to those parties and renders the solution less likely to
be preempted.
A final critique of this solution is that it may be accompanied
by substantial, and perhaps prohibitive, compliance costs. Especially if one of the broader classifications of contractual terms
suggested in Part III.B were adopted by a state, a large number
of terms in an adhesive contract would be swept up within it.
This would likely produce substantial compliance costs on businesses who use contracts of adhesion. Even if this is the case, the
fundamental purpose of the rule proposed above is to protect consumers, not to protect the bottom line of businesses that are governed by them. Businesses have long gotten away with contracting with relatively few restrictions and have doubtless profited
greatly from this freedom. Making contracts more equitable and
fairer should be primary to protecting the freedom to contract of
businesses. One realm in which this critique deserves a more
353. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses
Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433 (2010)
(discussing the reasons why businesses prefer arbitration).
354. See supra notes 264–72.
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thorough consideration is as it applies to small businesses, some
of which may be greatly impacted by a rule like the ones proposed above. However, such a detailed analysis is outside of the
scope of this Note.
CONCLUSION
More and more employers are using mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in employment contracts. Doing so gives employers benefits, such as privacy, the ability to select the arbitrators, and repeat players benefits, but they often leave employees
without meaningful recourse when they are wronged, especially
when class waivers are used. This effect on employees is unjust
and unpalatable in a society dedicated to the rule of law. However, there is a dearth of workable, effective solutions to this
growing problem. Action at the federal level is unlikely and
many attempts by states to soften the ill-effects of arbitration
have been held to be preempted by the FAA. The challenge then,
which this Note attempts to find a solution to, is to craft a new
rule that would mitigate the ill-effects of arbitration while avoiding FAA preemption.
To that end, this Note provides a path for state legislatures
and state courts to effect such a rule. The key to avoiding FAA
preemption is to craft a rule that is of general applicability, but
that will still combat the use of mandatory arbitration clauses.
The way this Note proposes to achieve that is to institute rules
that address the fact that many of these adhesive contracts offend basic contractual principles such as the requirement of mutual assent. States can enact laws that require terms that typically aren’t assented to by the non-drafting party, so called
“invisible terms,” to be highlighted or brought to the attention of
the non-drafting party at the time of contracting. Furthermore,
true assent requires the non-drafting party to not only know the
clause is in the contract, but also to understand the term and the
implications that flow from it. If states enact rules that achieve
true assent, the use of arbitration clauses, or at the very least
the most odious uses of them, are likely to decrease. This would
be a desirable outcome that helps protect the most vulnerable in
our society and would reaffirm this country’s commitment to preserving the right to vindicate one’s claims.

